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The Higher Education Act is now up for reauthorization.
Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law. This essay benefitted greatly from discussions with Professor
Michael Simkovic, recent law graduates and academics at the Education Finance Research Group meeting at the State University of New York at Buffalo
in 2015, and my colleagues during a summer workshop at the University of
Maryland in 2015. I also thank C.J. Pipins and Michael Tennison for excellent
research support.
2 See Reauthorizing the Higher Education Act: Exploring
Barriers and
Opportunities within Innovation: Hearing before the S. Comm. On Health,
Education,Labor, and Pensions, 114th Cong. (July 22, 2015),
http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/reauthorizing-the-higher-education-actexploring-barriers-and-opportunities-within-innovation.
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The Act provides support for both college and graduate students,
and institutions themselves. Meanwhile, the Department of Education (DOE) is crafting rules to implement a "Revised Pay as
You Earn" (REPAYE) program to help borrowers not eligible for
other income-based repayment programs.3 As each program is
crafted, policymakers need to carefully consider the balance between mission and margin in the largely non-profit higher education sector.4 Mission includes the research, teaching, and service
missions of the university. Margin refers to the stable financial
base of support needed to maintain the quality and continuity of
independent, civil society institutions.
Without some margin, higher education institutions cannot fulfill their mission. But without clear evidence that higher
education institutions are actually serving the full scope of their
missions, any margin is unjustified. This complex imperative-to
assure the integrity of educational mission while avoiding excessive costs-is at the core of higher education policy. There are also macroeconomic factors that make education policy decisions
particularly consequential now. As reauthorization approaches,
and REPAYE rules are drafted, Congress and the DOE should
keep in mind four core principles that are often obscured in current policy debates.
First, higher education policy must help ameliorate the effects of an era of economic inequality.' Corporations have already

For background on income contingent repayment, see John R. Brooks,
Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education,
104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming, 2015).
4 For background on the mission/margin balance in non-profits, see
Thomas L. Greeley & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in
the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
1 (2005). This article focuses on nonprofit institutions of higher education. Forprofit institutions pose different policy questions, and given their track record,
should be much more tightly scrutinized than nonprofits. See, e.g., TRESSIE
MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: How FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES DEEPEN

INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2016); John Quiggin, Thinking the Unthinkable,
JOHNQUIGGIN.COM,
http://johnquiggin.com/2015/10/16/thinking-theunthinkable/ ("There is now overwhelming evidence that for-profit education
has been a disastrous failure wherever it has been tried, and particularly where
for-profit firms can gain access to public funds through policies designed to
enhance 'consumer choice."').
I For documentation
of inequality, see ANTHONY
ATKINSON,
INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE (2015); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN
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shifted many risks to individuals by, for example, switching from
defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans.6 Though
most college and graduate school graduates can pay their debts,
in a higher education system as open to innovation and experimentation as the United States's, there will always be some individuals for whom higher education does not pay off. For them,
income-based repayment programs (IBR) are a crucial safety net.
These programs should be strengthened by new legislation and
rules.
Second, states have dramatically cut back their support
for higher education.7 A combination of tax cutting and expanding spending on prison populations and law enforcement has left
public colleges and universities struggling to maintain programs
and keep up with private institutions. Federal funding-whether
for direct scholarship programs, or indirectly in the form of federal credit programs-must fill the gap left by the states, lest millions of individuals suffer economic exclusion.
Third, institutions of higher education have broad and diverse goals and purposes, often inextricably intertwined, which
funders need to respect and support. Unfortunately, a permanent
austerity mindset among some members of Congress (and high
level DOE officials) has created interest in cheap, technologydriven quick fixes to improve access to higher education. These
range from online courses, to loosened accreditation standards, to
the reconfiguration of universities as mere certifiers validating the
acquisition of skills and learning elsewhere.8 While commendable
THE 2 1 sT CENTURY (2014).
6

On this and similar risk-shifting, see JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK

SHIFT (2007); Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561 (2015).
7 Michael Mitchell, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
at
3,
2015,
Pensions, June
Health, Education, Labor, and
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mitchellll.pdf (documenting dramatic cuts in state funding on higher education from 2007 to 2015, and commensurate increases in tuition costs).
I For a critique of bare certifier and other unbundled models, see Frank
Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 1161 (2014) (in health care sector); Frank Pasquale, Synergy and Tradition: The Unity of Research, Service, and Teaching in Legal Education, 40 J.
L. PROFESSION 1 (2015). For more on the problems of unaccredited schools in
the law school context, see Michael Simkovic, What Deregulated Law Schools
Really Look Like, BRIAN LEITER'S LAW SCHOOL REP. (July 31, 2015),
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as pilot programs, low-cost options should not be permitted to
prompt a predictable "race to the bottom" in educational quality.
As Australia learned when it made vocational education "contestable" (i.e., gave support to students in a variety of untested or
barely validated options), there are numerous entities capable of
cutting corners or even offering an entirely valueless "education"
to students.' Diploma mills, when left unchecked, can be enormously tempting profit centers for private capital. The recent
findings of the Senate HELP Committee on for-profit higher education in general should offer ample cautionary tales regarding
sudden "disruption" of traditional institutions. °
Fourth, higher education creates enormous value for both
students and society as a whole. Policymakers driven by a "return
on investment" (ROI) framework for federal spending and credit
programs should recognize the significant and lasting earnings
premiums and human capital acquisition generated by higher education.11 Education policy should also recognize the intangible,

http://eiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/07/what-deregulated-lawschools-really-look-like-michael-simkovic.html.
' John Ross, Senate demands contestability review, THE AUSTRALIAN
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/senatedemands-contestability-review/story-e6frgcjx-1227217379191
("[P]rivate education companies had made hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from
public subsidies at the same time public funding for technical and further education was being slashed."); Leesa Wheelahan, Victorian TAFE chaos: a lesson
in how not to reform vocational education, THE CONVERSATION (May 30,
2012),
https://theconversation.com/victorian-tafe-chaos-a-lesson-in-how-notto-reform-vocational-education-7296.
10 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS,
112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO
SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 37

(Comm. Print 2012). The recent collapse of Corinthians, a for-profit chain,
shows how devastating this business model can be for students taken in by it.
1, Memorandum on Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers
Manage Their Debt, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (June 9, 2014) ("College remains
a good investment, resulting in higher earnings and a lower risk of unemployment.") (hereinafter Memorandum); Frank McIntyre & Michael Simkovic, The
Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014); David Leonhardt, Is College Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/upshot/is-college-worth-it-clearlynew-data-say.html?abt=0002&abg=0&_r=0; David Leonhardt, Even for Cashiers, College Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/sunday-review/26leonhardt.html; Michael
Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2015),
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hard-to-monetize, and long-term benefits generated by colleges
and universities. However, even in the very narrow framework of
ROI for better-skilled labor, extant federal investment in higher
education is well worth it and ought to be increased.
These four principles guide this essay's commentary on
two current policy debates in U.S. higher education financing.
Part I addresses the DOE's proposed regulations to implement
REPAYE for income-driven repayment of federal student loans. 2
Part II broadens the focus, making the case for lower interest
rates on student loans and more generous debt forgiveness programs in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education
Act. The essay concludes with reflections on the macroeconomic
value of higher education.

I. EXTENDING INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT IN THE
REVISED PAY As You EARN PLAN
Federal student loan programs impose unique burdens
and obligations on borrowers. 3 Such loans are very rarely discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. 4 However, since 1993, Congress has required the DOE to provide a repayment program that
caps payments at a certain percentage of income, and forgives the
debt after a certain term of years (Income-Contingent Repayment, or ICR). 5 Given the unfavorable terms set by DOE at the

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2551567;
Michael Simkovic, Do Increases in the Cost of College Pay for Themselves?, BRIAN
LEITER'S
LAW
SCHOOL
REP.
(Aug.
5,
2015),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/08/do-increases-in-the-cost-ofcollege-pay-for-themselves.htmL
12 Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan
Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg.
39608 (proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts 668, 662, & 685).
13 Michael Konczal,
Sweet Forgiveness, BOS. REV. (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/sweet-forgiveness.
14 Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges
and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 495 (2012) (noting
that hardship exemptions were very rarely asked for, but were granted more
often than many estimate); Tara Siegel Bernard, Judges Rebuke Limits on
Wiping Out Student Loan Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/your-money/student-loans/judges-rebuke-

limits-on-wiping-out-student-loan-debt.html?_r=0.
5 Am. Bar Ass'n, Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates, Aug.
11-12,

2014,
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time, the program was not widely used.16 However, it did provide
some relief for borrowers caught between the Scylla of nondischargeability and the Charybdis of mounting debt.
By 2007, Congress was ready to improve on the ICR program. It mandated a new program, commonly deemed IBR (Income-Based Repayment). Borrowers who are enrolled in IBR pay
15% of discretionary income each year. 17 A person or family's
discretionary income is their adjusted gross income (AGI) minus
150% of the poverty level for that person or family. For example,
if a person's AGI was $30,000 in 2015 and the poverty level was
$10,000, discretionary income would be $30,000 minus $15,000
(150% of $10,000) or $15,000. Accordingly, the yearly loan repayment would be capped at $2,250 (15% of $15,000). Moreover,
all borrowers in this program would see the remainder of their
debt forgiven after 25 years, 8 while those in public service jobs
(defined as full-time work for the government or a tax-exempt organization) would see forgiveness after 10 years under the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program. 9
However, it is important to note that the ultimate debt
forgiveness would count as income in the year in which it occurred. Thus, if a student chose payment options that 6nly covered interest accrual (or less), there could be a sizeable tax bill
due, particularly on the 25-year plan. Moreover, given spotty
administration of the program, many are concerned that borrowers will either be misled about the availability of forgiveness, or

http://www.americanbar.org/contentdam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/PSLF2014r
es.authcheckdam.pdf, page 3. The 1993 legislation "required the Secretary of
Education to offer borrowers an income contingent repayment plan through
which students would pay 20% of their income each year toward their federal
student loan repayment, and the Secretary would cancel any remaining balance at the end of a period of repayment not to exceed 25 years." Id.
16 Philip G. Schrag, The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option
for Law Student Loans, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 830-31 (2001)
("[P]olicymakers originally anticipated ICR would be used by 15-30% of borrowers. The Secretary of Education projected that between 1996-2000, 17% of
all direct loans.., would be repaid under the income- contingent repayment
option. In fact, [as of 2000] fewer than 1% of new borrowers at schools that offer federal direct loans [chose] income-contingent repayment.").
17 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012).
Is Id.
'9

20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i).
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that government contractors will impose documentation hurdles
on those attempting to avail themselves of IBR.2 0
Congress amended IBR in 2010 to shorten the repayment
period to 20 years and reduce the repayment obligation to 10% of
discretionary income for those who borrowed in 2014 or later. 21 In
2012, the Obama Administration deployed funds to permit those
who had borrowed in 2007 or later and entered repayment in
2012 or later to enroll in this more generous version of IBR. Given extraordinary government profits from student loans in repayment (the government's costs of borrowing have been far
lower than the interest earned from student debt), this was a fair
change in policy. In 2014, President Obama called on the DOE to
develop a program to assist pre-2007 borrowers on terms similar
to those of extant IBR.2 2 DOE released a plan to do so in a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) of July 9, 2015, deeming the
proposed program the Revised Pay as You Earn plan
(REPAYE). 3
Unfortunately, the DOE has proposed several conditions
on entry into REPAYE of dubious merit either as a matter of policy or as a reflection of the President's wishes. For example, DOE
has chosen to include the borrower's spouse's income in calcula-

20 Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, How the attempt to fix student loans got

bogged down by the middlemen, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-the-educationdepartment-turned-into-a-massive-bank/2015/08/23/7618f2 fa- 1442-1 le5-9ddce3353542100c_story.html ("There are also questions about whether servicers,
to maximize their profits, are misleading people about their repayment options.
Advocacy groups say rather than helping struggling borrowers enroll in income-driven plans - a time- and resource-heavy effort - servicers opt for an
easier, short-term solution such as deferring the payments."); DEANNE LOONrN
AND PERSIS WU, POUNDING STUDENT BORROWERS: THE HEAVY COSTS OF
THE GOVERNMENT'S PARTNERSHIP WITH DEBT COLLECTION AGENCIES, 1617 (2014), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-sldebt-collectors.pdf.
21 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e).
22 Memorandum, supra note 11.
23 Student Assistance General Provisions, supra note 12 ("On June 9 2014,
the President issued a memorandum (79 FR 33843) directing the Secretary to
propose regulations by June 9, 2015, that will allow additional students who
borrowed Federal Direct Loans to cap their Federal student loan payments at
10 percent of their income.").
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tions of the 10% repayment figure.24 As education finance law expert Philip Schrag has observed, this decision expressly contradicts the intent expressed by Congress in extant legislation on the
issue.2 5 DOE has made the time-to-forgiveness twenty-five (25)
years for those with any graduate school debt, even though it
could have made it less. 26 DOE has also included a number of
confusing provisions about eligibility for non-accrual of interest
once a borrower is enrolled in REPAYE." One expert commenter
opined that it may be impossible for many borrowers to accurately understand their rights and obligations under the program.2"
Other commenters also criticized REPAVE for being unduly complex and punitive. They made the case for shortening
the repayment period needed to earn forgiveness of debt, and softening or elimination of the marriage penalty in the proposed
rules.29 Unfortunately, the DOE may not fully understand the
24 Id. at 39609.
25 Philip Schrag, Comment on Student Assistance General Provisions,

Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39608 (proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified
685),
&
662,
668,
pts
C.F.R.
34
at
ht-tp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D = ED-2014-OPE-0161-1266
("The statutory authority for ICR did not give the Department the authority to
impose a marriage penalty on borrowers who file separate tax returns. It provides that '[a] repayment schedule ... shall be based on the adjusted gross income ... of the borrower or, if the borrower is married andfiles a Federal income tax return jointly with the borrower's spouse, on the adjusted gross
income of the borrower and the borrower's spouse.' 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(e)(2)
(emphasis added). Thus, the Department is authorized only to base the repayment obligation on the AGI of the borrower, unless the borrower files a joint
return.").
26 Student Assistance General Provisions, supra note 12. ("a borrower
would qualify for forgiveness after 25 years if the loans being repaid under the
REPAYE plan include a loan the borrower received to pay for graduate or
professional study or a consolidation loan that repaid a loan received to pay for
graduate or professional study.").
27 John R. Brooks, Comment on Student Assistance General Provisions,
Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39608 (Proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified
685),
&
662,
668,
pts
C.F.R.
34
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ED-2014-OPE-0161-2886.
28 Id. ("The complex way in which interest is forgiven will make it largely
impossible for borrowers to estimate what their costs of repayment will be.").
29 Senators have also weighed in to this effect. See Senators to Dept. of
Education: Proposed Changes to Student Loan Program could Harm Borrowers, Sheldon Whitehouse: U.S. Senator for R.I. (June 16, 2015),
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value of higher education (see Part A) and the cost of federal credit programs (see Part B). Taking the true benefits and costs into
account, the DOE would be well-advised to make the terms of
REPAYE more accommodating and simpler (see Part C).
A. The DOE Understates the Value of Higher Education
The DOE should not understate the value of higher education. There is extensive work based on empirical data that independently documents the value of higher education.30 There is
also sophisticated work synthesizing the literature of labor economists on the earnings premium conferred by higher education
(and controlling for selection effects).3 1 The DOE should give a
more fine-grained accounting of these benefits before imposing
burdensome and complex limitations on the availability of loan
forgiveness.
There are also unique equity and timing considerations
that recommend more generous treatment of the borrowers targeted by REPAYE who borrowed before 2008. Specifically, between 2008 and 2013, student loans generated a $120 billion surplus for the government.32 The education attained by these
borrowers created human capital that will pay dividends to the
government, in the form of higher taxes and reduced need for social services, for years to come. 3
Moreover, pre-2007 borrowers could not have foreseen the
global financial crisis that started in 2008 and devastated U.S.

http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-to-dept-of-educationproposed-changes-to-student-loan-program-could-harm-borrowers. A proposal
currently under review by the Department would, according to the Senators,
"add unnecessary complexity, increase costs for responsible low- and middleincome borrowers, and result in the disparate treatment of graduate and undergraduate borrowers." Id.
30 See, e.g., McIntyre & Simkovic, supra note 11; Leonhardt, Is College
Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, supra note 11; Leonhardt, Even for Cashiers, College Pays Off, supra note 11.
31 Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, supra note 11; Simkovic, Do Increases
in the Cost of College Pay for Themselves?, supra note 11.
32 Shahien Nasripour, Obama Student Loan Policy Reaping $51 Billion
Profit, HUFFINGTON

POST:

HUFF

POST

POLITICS

(May

14,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/obama-student-loans-policyprofit n 3276428.html.
33 Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, supra note 11.

2013),
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employment figures. Declines in employment in many fields were
not due to a lack of initiative by such borrowers, and such borrowers did not cause and could not have foreseen many of the
structural changes in the economy that hurt their earnings power.
A cyclical downturn of greater intensity and duration than any
the U.S. has experienced since the 1930s is ample reason for the
DOE to use statutory authority to benefit borrowers straightforwardly, rather than creating a labyrinth of exceptions and exceptions to exceptions that can easily trap even the careful in suboptimal repayment plans.
In summary, the DOE should accurately count the contribution of student borrowers to workforce preparedness, overall
economic growth, and future tax revenues when considering the
proper scope and nature of debt forgiveness through REPAYE.
The education sector generates enormous value for the economy
as a whole and for most graduates, but it is a fiscal and moral imperative that the DOE ease the plight of borrowers who are experiencing difficulty repaying. Given the rising costs of housing,
child care, and medical care, payments above 10% of discretionary income could significantly compromise borrowers' financial
security. Just as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) aims to help individuals and families avoid excessive health costs, so too should
education finance policy promote financial security by better constraining debt repayment obligations.34

For ACA estimates, see Allison Hoffman, Health Care Spending and
FinancialSecurity after the Affordable Care Act, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (2014).
Health care regulation has long been characterized by the kind of complex interactions between providers, private and public financers, and "consumers,"
which now complicate the financing of higher education. I put "consumers" in
quotes because neither students nor patients are the sole beneficiaries of investments made in their education or health. Society benefits as well, and public resources are needed to avoid suboptimal investment in both fields. The
federal government must do more to make up the massive reductions in state
support in higher education that have occurred over the past 30 years. See,
e.g., Frank Pasquale, Income-based Debt Forgiveness: The Least the Government
Can
Do,
BALKINIZATION
(July
18,
2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/07/income-based-debt-forgiveness-least.html;
Karin Fischer & Jack Stripling, An Era of Neglect, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC.
(March
3,
2014),
http://chronicle.com/article/An-Era-of34

Neglect/145045/.
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B. The DOE Overstates the Cost of Loan Forgiveness

Loan forgiveness is not a simple cost to government. Borrowers who have financial difficulties may default on their loans
due to their inability to pay. In such cases, forgiveness simply
helps the borrower avoid the kind of career-wrecking credit record that can keep defaulters from getting jobs (and paying taxes)
years after they default. Without a more robust REPAYE program, there will probably be more defaults as bankruptcy judges
try to expand the definition of "hardship" to accommodate overburdened debtors and debtors seek help with debts they are unable to repay.35
The costs of the program are presented in an opaque way
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM estimates the cost of REPAYE to the U.S. Treasury at $15.3 billion
from 2016 to 2025, but that figure is not adequately balanced by
an estimate of the fiscal benefits of student loan programs overall
to the Treasury and to the economy as a whole. The DOE should
also take into account the work of Gregory Crespi, who projects a
very low number of law graduates who are eligible for REPAYE
and will enter into the program given the unfavorable terms for it
drafted in the NPRM. 36 Given the similar situation of many oth.-.
ers in professional programs, estimates of the cost of these programs ought to be lowered.
C. Recommendations
Unfortunately, the NPRM draft on REPAYE does not reflect President Obama's call for a streamlined route to improved
IBR options for the borrowers it is supposed to serve. One key
shortcoming is the administrative complexity of the proposal.
Longstanding executive branch policy has called for reducing paperwork and diminishing the already great cognitive burdens on
beneficiaries of government programs." REPAYE's complex
rules on many issues, including determination of which payments
count upon entry or exit of an IBR program, or upon consolida-

s Bernard, supra note 14; Juliano, supra note 14.
36 Gregory S. Crespi, The Obama Administration's New 'REPAYE' Plan

for Student Loan Borrowers:Not Much Help for Law School Graduates(2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2629645.
31 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013).
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tion, will likely deter participation. Rules regarding capitalization
of interest also must be clarified, and the government should, in
general, avoid creating situations where compounding interest
can leave a debtor liable for paying more than twice the amount
he or she borrowed. There are already reports of servicers discouraging eligible borrowers from participating in Pay As You
Earn (PAYE) because of its complexity (and ostensibly because
they fear that Congress will change the rules). Such worries lead
to unnecessary defaults. REPAYE will risk the same fate if its
complexity renders it difficult to explain in a straightforward
way.
The marriage penalty embedded in the proposed rule is also unnecessarily harsh. Other commentators, such as Professor
Phil Schrag, have amply explained the infirmities of the approach
laid out in the NPRM. An unintended consequence of the NPRM
draft will be strategic delays in marriage or divorces. The DOE
should consider potential costs to the Treasury and disruptions to
family life, attributable to the strategic decisions it could encourage due to the marriage penalty now embedded in the NPRM.

II. DEFENDING INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT IN THE
HIGHER EDUCATION ACT REAUTHORIZATION
At present, students taking out federal loans to pay for
higher education enjoy certain protections, including the incomecontingent repayment options discussed above.3" Private lenders
do not offer such income-contingent repayment plans. 39 Federal
loans also help level the playing field in other ways.4" Private
lenders can perform credit checks that, for those with low credit
scores, can just as easily reflect misfortune or a bad economy as
genuine credit risk.41 These credit checks can exclude those parJohn R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing
of
Higher Education,
104
GEO.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2513359; see also Philip G.
Schrag, Failing Law Schools-Tamanaha's Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 387, 389 (2013).
31 Federal versus
Private Loans, U.S. DEP'T
OF
EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last visited August
1, 2015).
38

40 Id.
41

For more details on biased and arbitrary credit checks and credit scor-

ing, see FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY 23 (2015) (describing
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ticularly in need of help.
While federal loans are available to all at the same interest
rates, private lenders often aim to charge subprime borrowers
more than prime borrowers.4 Alternatively, they may charge borrowers from wealthy families (or attending wealthy institutions)
less-a form of "cherrypicking" (choosing the best risks) familiar
to the pre-PPACA health insurance industry. Moreover, federal
loans rarely require co-signers; private loans may.43 While federal
loans offer options "to delay or temporarily forgo payments (like
deferment and forbearance)," "discharge upon a borrower's
death," and "discharge upon permanent disability (with certain
limitations)," private loans may not offer any of these options.4 4
This divergence has led to predictable horror stories for borrowers who chose private loans.45
In short, private loans impose a number of disadvantages
on borrowers.4 6 Yet as the Higher Education Act comes up for
reauthorization, many commentators are now calling for the federal government to act more like a private lender by raising student loan interest rates and cutting back on protections for borrowers. This advocacy is part of a larger debate about federal

scores as "opaque, arbitrary, and discriminatory").
42 Federalversus Private Loans, supra note 39.
43

Id.

44

What are the main differences between federal student loans and private

student

loans?,

CONSUMER

FIN.

PROT.

BUREAU,

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/545/what-are-main-differencesbetween-federal-student-loans-and-private-student-loans.html
(last visited
August 1, 2015).
45 See Mary Pilon, When Student Loans Live On After Death, WALL ST. J.
(Aug.
7,
2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000142405274870474190457540951052978386
0.
46 John R. Brooks and Jonathan D. Glater, Opinion, Raise the
Cap on
Federal
Student
Loans,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0803-brooks-glater-biggerstudent-loans-20150803-story.html ("Private student loans are usually much
more costly for students; a government report from 2012 found interest rates in
excess of 16%, and nothing has improved since then. By contrast, the rate on
the most widely used federal student loan currently is 4.29%. Private loans accounted for a quarter of all student lending in 2007-08 before falling sharply in
the wake of the financial crisis. But because federal loan caps have not budged
even as tuition has increased, private lending is rising again, and made up
about 9% of new debt in 2013-14.").
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credit programs.4 ' For example, some argue that there is no market failure here and that private lenders could take the government's place.4 8 Observing the federal government's long run of
profits from the federal student loan program, one might apply
that approach to education credit-if one were completely unaware of the many ways in which federal loans protect borrowers.
For others, this very protectiveness is suspicious. They argue that
government credit programs must play by the same harsh rules as
private lenders, or else quantify any ground they give as a loss
that must be made up either by higher taxes, or reduced spending
on other programs.4 9
These two, contradictory positions create a pincer attack
on federal loans. One set of critics argues that government gains
from student loans simply indicate the superfluity of a federal
role. Another set insists that agencies need to act in as profitoriented a manner as private lenders or account for their support
in public accounting that fails to reflect the government's unique
role in credit creation. Either set of arguments can be deployed
strategically by commentators to undermine support for student
borrowers. White papers from the New America Foundation by
Jason Delisle and Alexander Holt, which are critical of current
policies for income-based repayment, are particularly troubling,
given their assumption of a logic of austerity and zero-sum allocation of education resources. °

47 Michael Grunwald, The Real Bank of America, Politico (Jan./Feb.
2015), http:/Iwww.politico.com/magazinelstoryl2015/01/federal-loans-bank-ofamerica-113920.html.
48 Id. ("If the deals are low-risk layups, why is Uncle Sam involved?").
41 Jason Delisle & Jason Richwine, The Case for Fair Value Accounting, 21
Nat'l
Affairs
95
(2014),
available
at
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-case-for-fair-valueaccounting.
'0 JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
SAFETY NET OR WINDFALL? EXAMINING CHANGES TO INCOME-BASED
REPAYMENT
FOR
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS
(2012),
available at

http://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/safety-net-or-windfall/

[hereinaf-

ter SAFETY NET]; JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AMERICA
EDUCATION, ZERO MARGINAL COST: MEASURING SUBSIDIES FOR GRADUATE
EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM (2014),

available

at

http://www.edcentral.org/wp-

content/uploads/20141091ZeroMarginalCost_140910_DelisleHolt.pdf [hereinafter ZERO MARGINAL COST]. The New America Foundation has received funds

from the Lumina Foundation, which has had close ties to private lenders.
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Evocatively designed with images of raining $100 dollar
bills and a mischievous-looking student eager to grab a "windfall"
of loan forgiveness, the reports have garnered a great deal of media attention. Unfortunately, they fail to give an accurate picture
of the benefits of IBR while exaggerating its costs. Safety Net or
Windfall only manages to paint IBR as a boon to the wealthy by
idiosyncratically defining "high incomes" to include earnings that
many would recognize as middle class-particularly in high-cost
urban areas. Zero Marginal Cost presents some questionable distributive outcomes in a series of hypothetical repayment scenarios, but never presents solid evidence on how likely they are to
come to pass. It would be inadvisable to alter the IBR program
now, to the detriment of students facing volatile demand for labor, in order to fight phantom shortfalls that may only arise decades from today-and may never come about at all.
A. The DistributionalEffects of Income Based Repayment
The Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF) are important incomebased repayment programs. Presently, those who enroll in PAYE
are only obliged to pay 10% of their discretionary income51 to-

These lenders would greatly benefit from policy proposals to reduce federal
loan forgiveness options and raise federal loan interest rates, because each
move would make their own products comparatively more attractive. See, e.g.,
Molly Hensley-Clancy & Katie J.M. Baker, How a Private Foundation with
Student Loan Ties Became a Force in Higher Education, BUZZFEED (May 22,
2014),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/mollyhensleyclancy/how-a-privatefoundation-with-deep-ties-to-the-student-loan#.mqKyz8vP6. Lumina not only
pays for research, but also pays for journalists to publicize the research. See
Jennifer Ruark, To Shape the National Conversation, Gates and Lumina Support
Journalism, CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(July
14,
2013),
http://chronicle.com/article/To-Shape-the-National140297/. According to its
own history, "Lumina was sensitive to the perception that the Foundation was
linked to the student loan industry" at its inception. LUMINA FOUNDATION,
FROM THE GROUND UP: AN EARLY HISTORY OF THE LUMINA FOUNDATION

22 (2007), https://www.luminafoundation.org/files/resources/from-the-groundup.pdf. Given that important initial board members (and the current board
chairman) had ties to private lenders, that is no surprise. Id., at 14 (Four
founding board members of Lumina were former "directors of the Sallie Mae
board of directors; all others had been members of the USA Group board.");
ALAN COLLINGE, THE STUDENT LOAN SCAM 76 (2009).

"' See
Income-based
Repayment,
EDFINANCIAL
SERV.,
http://www.edfinancial.com/IBR (last visited May 29, 2015). The site gives an
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ward loan repayment, and their loans are forgiven after twenty
years of payments. Borrowers eligible for PLSF, those who have
spent ten years in full-time public service employment while repaying 10% of their discretionary income,53 are entitled to forgiveness of the remaining balance after ten years. 4
To Delisle and Holt, this "sounds like a get-rich-quick
scam. 5 5 They are particularly concerned about "high-income"
borrowers using IBR to obtain debt forgiveness-even if their
paid-down principal and interest payments more than compensate the government for the cost of making the loan.56 They aim
to require any single individual with an AGI over 300% of the
federal poverty level (FPL) to pay 15%, rather than 10%, of AGI.
They would force twenty-five years of repayment onto those in
PAYE if their loans exceeded $40,000 when they entered repayment. In Zero Marginal Cost, they argue that "policymakers
should consider changes to [PAYE] and PSLF that place greater
limits on the benefits and the types of jobs that qualify borrowers
'5
for loan forgiveness. 1 1
Given the benefits of higher education documented above,
these recommendations are puzzling. Policymakers should be rewarding higher educational attainments, not worsening their
terms of financing. Federal borrowing costs are at very low levels-why impose further burdens on graduates when the government itself can borrow on global markets at such low rates?

explanation of the calculation: discretionary income is adjusted gross income
minus 150% of the poverty level for a family of the size of the borrower's family. Id.
52 Health Care & Educ. Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e) (2012)); Fed. Student Aid, Pay as You Earn Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn
(last
visited May 28, 2015).
13 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i) (2012). Public service
employment is
defined to include full-time service for any level of government and for any organization exempt from taxation under § 501(a) and described in § 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
54 Id.
55 SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 1.
56

Id. at l1.

57 ZERO MARGINAL

COST,

supra note 50, at 23.
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But the reports make sense given the priors of the authors.
Delisle has questioned the value of graduate education and assistance to graduate students. "An undergraduate degree, we've all
sort of decided, is a must for earning a middle-class income," he
has stated. "A master of arts? Probably not. These are all people
who have an undergrad degree. They have all made it, in that
sense. They are a success. The question then is, 'What is the purpose of the public support of the master's degree?"' 5 This viewpoint is a milder version of that of his New America colleague,
Kevin Carey, who would essentially end the university as we
know it.59 New America's education policy group appears to have
both a long and short game: reduce federal support for graduate
schools now, while encouraging the "creative destruction" of institutions of higher education in the long run. Unsurprisingly, the
two objectives further the commercial interests of the private
student lending interests so influential at the Lumina Foundation's inception, and those of the technology firms which also
support New America.
In Zero Marginal Cost, Delisle and Holt present a variety
of scenarios in which holders of graduate degrees may be earning
an above-average income, but still enjoy some student loan debt
forgiven. For Delisle & Holt, this is problematic because loan forgiveness creates a moral hazard problem-why should students
borrow responsibly, they ask, if they are certain that the amounts
borrowed will be forgiven? But this view underestimates the
problems of current income -based repayment programs, including worries about their effect on credit scores and the tax consequences of forgiveness of long-accruing interest. They claim that
their work is based on a "more comprehensive and long-term perspective of how IBR affects different types of borrowers, particularly as borrowers' incomes change over their repayment terms.""0
However, its "long-term" projections regarding the costs of these
programs are premised on an inadequate evidence base. Worries

Vimal Patel, Grad-School Debt is Said to Rise Rapidly and Deserve
More Policy Attention, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://chronicle.com/article/Grad-School-Debt-Is-Said-to/145539J.
11 See Audrey Watters & Sara Goldrick-Rab, Techno Fantasies, INSIDE
58

HIGHER

EDUC.

(Mar.

26,

2015),

https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2015/03/26/essay-challenging-kevincareys-new-book-higher-education.
60 SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 3.
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over "irresponsible" borrowers are also more properly targeted at
for-profit programs' abuse of credit programs, rather than student loans as a whole.6 1
B. Accurately Accountingfor Education's Costs & Benefits
The New America Foundation's (NAF) promotion of
harsher terms for PAYE and PLSF is premised on the idea that
these programs will eventually prove to be an unsustainable fiscal
burden. However, PAYE and PLSF should be judged as part of a
larger student loan program. That program has proven to be a
net benefit to government finances. The government has made
tens of billions of dollars each year from students.6 1 Under established Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) models, the government made $120 billion from student loan programs from 2008 to
2013.63

Some have tried to downplay projected gains from the
programs by promoting an alternative accounting approach,
"fair-value accounting" (FVA). This approach derogates the federal student loan program as a fiscal burden by effectively assuming (a) that the government could instead lend at the higher rates

61 Stefan Collini, Sold Out, LONDON REV. BOOKS Oct. 24, 2013, at 3-12,
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n20/stefan-collini/sold-out.
62 Shahien Nasiripour, Student Loan Rates Boost Government Profit as
Debt
Damps Economy,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
9,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/student-loan-rates-debteconomy-n 3048216.html.
63 Id.; see also Congressional Budget Office, No. 4705, Options to Change
Interest Rates and Other Terms on Student Loans (June 10, 2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44318-StudentLoans.pdf
("Under
FCRA's rules, CBO estimates, savings from the program will be $184 billion
for loans made between 2013 and 2023"). The CBO later promoted a different
accounting method, but has not explained convincingly why it wants to depart
from past methodology. See Mike Konczal, Do Taxpayers Care if Student
Loans are Paid Off Too Quickly? (On Fair Value Accounting), NEXT NEW
DEAL (June 11, 2014), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/do-taxpayerscare-if-student-loans-are-paid-too-quickly-fair-value-accounting.
Moreover,
the CBO is required by law to use FCRA standard accounting, and when it
does so, it consistently finds "negative subsidies" (i.e., profits) regarding student
loan programs. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, STUDENT LOAN
PROGRAMS
BASELINE
PROJECTIONS
(Mar.
2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44198-201503-StudentLoan.pdf ("the federal government will save on average about 11
cents for each new dollar loaned in 2016").
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now prevailing at private institutions, and (b) that defaults will
rise. The first argument fails for several reasons. 6 As Matt Yglesias states, "costs reported in the budget are generally lower than
the costs to the most efficient private financial institutions because the government's costs of funds are in fact lower." 5 At an
even more elementary level: what would be the point of a federal
loan program if it simply copied the terms and rates of private
lenders? Rate-setting for federal student loans also needs to
acknowledge the harshness of the present bankruptcy regime:
students already facing presumptive nondischargeability should
not be further burdened with higher interest rates.
It is hard to overstate how radical a change FVA would
present to current, accepted standards. For the years 2015 - 2024,
"The Department of Education's four largest student loan programs would yield budgetary savings of roughly $135 billion under [long-established] FCRA accounting but cost roughly $88 billion on a fair-value basis. 6 6 Of course, those committed to an
ideological vision of shrinking government would rejoice at this
potential sea change in accounting.6 7 Meanwhile, the Center on

David Kamin, Risky Returns: Accountingfor Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 724, 771 (2013) (calling approaches like FVA "much more misleading than.., enlightening").
6 Matt Yglesias, Fair Value Accounting Overestimates Lending Costs,
2012),
10,
(Apr.
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/04/10/fairvalueaccounting-over
estimateslending-costs.html.
64

66 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST
OF SELECTED FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR 2015 TO 2024 (2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-

2014/reports/45383-FairValue.pdf. Even when constrained by FCRA, the
CBO has overestimated the cost of health care programs repeatedly. Frank
Pasquale, Politicized Prognosticationat CBO, BALKINIZATION (July 28, 2009),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/07/politicized-prognostication-at-cbo.html

(quoting Bruce Vladeck, former administrator of the Health Care Financing
Administration) ("'The CBO's track record in predicting the effects of health
legislation is abysmal. Over the last two decades, the CBO has routinely overestimated the costs of expanded government health care benefits and underestimated the savings from program changes designed to reduce expenditures."').
67 PAUL RYAN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE PATH
(2013),
AMERICA'S
PROMISE
43-44
PROSPERITY:
RESTORING
TO
("Accounting
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperity2013.pdf
for market risk in scoring these programs [student loans] would simultaneously
reflect their true cost to taxpayers and make risky expansions of these programs less likely to occur."). Note that many who share this position also favor
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Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) has soberly documented the
fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of government
spending it encompasses. °" In 2012, Center for American Progress
(CAP) criticized fair value as "an accounting trick" designed "to
make credit programs appear more expensive than they truly
are. "69 CAP argued that FCRA budgeting already accounts for
"credit risk," and that accounting for "market risk"-"the rate a
risk-averse private investor would charge for the perceived variability in [FCRA] estimates"-is not only unnecessary, it produces inaccurate budget estimates, adds "phantom" costs that never
materialize, and harms credit programs.7"
Concern about future defaults raises an issue that is concentrated in for-profit schools: 46% of 2012 defaulters (on loans
that entered repayment in 2010) "attended for-profit colleges,.
which enrolled just 13% of students nationally."71 Limitations of
funds for students at schools with high default rates would be far
more targeted an approach than across-the-board limits.72 Indeed,
with the implementation of Gainful Employment rules targeting
for-profit colleges, the DOE has already begun to address the issue.7 3 Moreover, as data emerges about borrower profiles, it appears that defaults are most common among those with the

"dynamic scoring" of tax cuts, which presume economic effects from tax cuts
long ago dismissed by Republican George H.W. Bush as "voodoo economics."
68 RICHARD KOGAN, PAUL VAN DE WATER, & JAMES HORNEY, CTR. ON

BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, HOUSE BILL WOULD ARTIFICIALLY
INFLATE COST OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS (June 18, 2013),

http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-23-12bud4.pdf
69 John Griffith, An Unfair Value for Taxpayers: "FairValue" Budgeting
is a Dangerous Game to Play with Federal Loans and Guarantees, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS 1 (Feb. 9, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/fair.value.pdf.
10 Id. at 1-2.
71 New Data Confirm Troubling Student Loan Default Problems: ForProfit Colleges Still Have Highest Rate, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS
(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/CDR_2013_NR.pdf.
12 It should also be sensitive to documented default rates. Graduate
schools in general have lower rates of default than undergraduate institutions,

a fact not acknowledged adequately in Zero Marginal Cost. See generally
ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 50.
71 Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Increases Accountability for LowPerforming For-Profit Institutions, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (July 1, 2015),

http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-obama-administrationincreases-accountability-low-performing-profit-institutions

2015).

(last visited July 1,
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smallest debts-again, undermining the popular narrative that
4
graduate students with large loan balances are fiscal threats.1
Any estimate of future defaults in the student loan context
should adequately acknowledge how harshly bankruptcy law
treats such debts with a presumption of nondischargeability.
Moreover, estimates should not be based on extant private loan
markets, because that is where the worst credit risks now are likely to be concentrated. There is a potential ratchet effect here, too.
If private lenders continually lend at a rate a few percentage
points above the public rate, and FVA requires public lenders to
lend at the private rate, then future adjustments to government
rates to reflect private rates at one point in time may simply empower private lenders to charge more at a later point in time.
This is a particular danger if the private student loan market
75
again becomes as concentrated as it was in the mid-2000s.
Whatever one believes about FVA, and the changes to
PAYE and PLSF that the programs' critics would make based on
it, the ultimate impact of the critics' proposals is clear: financing
an education will become more expensive. That would either reduce the quantity or price of education (to the extent it is dependent on loan programs), or reduce the discretionary income of students and graduates, or, most likely, have some combination of
these effects. Each possibility is likely to have negative effects.
Decades of empirical research in labor economics establish
that higher education not only correlates with improved labor
market outcomes: it causes them. Investments in higher education
also contribute to faster innovation and more rapid economic

" Susan Dynarski, Why Students With Smallest Debts Have the Larger
2015,
Aug.
31,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Problem,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/upshot/why-students-with-smallest-debtsneed-the-greatest-help.html ("It's natural for people listening to the politicians
to connect the two facts with a causal arrow: More debt leads to more default.
But the reality is surprising: Borrowers who owe the most are least likely to
default.").
15 DEANNE LOONIN, THE SALLIE MAE SAGA: A GOVERNMENTCREATED, STUDENT DEBT FUELED PROFIT
COLLINGE, THE STUDENT LOAN SCAM 13 (2009)

MACHINE

(2014);

ALAN

("By 2006, Sallie Mae virtually dominated the student loan industry. It was about four times larger than
its nearest competitor (Citibank), manag[ing] $123 billion in student loans.").
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growth.7 6 Delisle and Holt warn about IBR subsidizing "high-cost
graduate and professional schools."77 But costs and quality are
correlated: aside from those in the for-profit sector, more expensive programs devote more resources to instruction and therefore
produce better student outcomes. Student loan default rates are
typically lower for more expensive and higher quality programs,
while default rates are higher for less expensive and lower quality
programs and those with lower completion rates.78
Higher education provides public benefits in the form of
increased income and payroll tax revenues and lower burdens on
publicly-funded social services. The tax revenue benefits aloneapproximately forty percent of every extra dollar an individual
earns because of increased educational attainment-are typically
more than enough to fully cover the costs of higher education.7 9
Most individuals who defer payment of their loans in early years
while their incomes are low will eventually repay their loans in
full and with interest. Educated workers' earnings grow rapidly
as they gain experience and typically peak decades after they
have completed their degrees. Even partial repayment of a loan
can still produce a profit for lender because the partial payments
are often more than sufficient to cover financing and administrative costs.
Critics of IBR say that life-cycle equities counsel against
forgiving loans at ten or twenty years into repayment because a
borrower may be entering a highly paid phase of their career. But
to correct for that fairly, they should also be advocating for reducing how much borrowers must pay at earlier, lower-paid phases
of their career. Life-cycle equity cannot be a one-way ratchet toward squeezing borrowers, or else the concept loses all meaning.

See generally Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 527 (2013).
77 SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 13.
78 Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, supra note 76; Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 11. Consider as well recent evidence on for-profit law schools.
Patricia Cohen, For-Profit Colleges Accused of Fraud Still Receive U.S.
76

Funds,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Oct.

12,

2015),

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/for-profit-colleges-accused-offraud-still-receive-us-funds.html? r=1 ("Kaplan's schools, including its online
California law school, where only one in five students graduates, received
$7 76.3 million worth of federal student loans and grants last year.").
79 Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 11, at 283.
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C. FiscalAnalysis of Loans should not be Partial

Program performance should be evaluated with respect to
the percent of loans originated, not the percent currently outstanding. Many successful graduates repay their loans and shrink
their balances, while those who are less successful defer payment
and grow their balances.8 0 Measuring performance of the percent
of loans outstandingintroduces survivorship bias. 1
If federal student loans were abolished in favor of private
provision of credit, students would be forced to pay more for an
education of lower quality.82 Furthermore, more education spending would go to interest payments and less would go to instruction and support services that benefit students.83 Additionally,
fewer students would complete their degrees, unemployment
would be higher, economic growth would be slower, and the fed4
eral budget would be on a shakier footing than it is today.

80

See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS

FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 80-83 (2009), available at
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2 .pdf.
81 See generally Tyler Shumway, ForecastingBankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model, 74 J. Bus. 101 (2001).
82 Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow
College Students to Borrow More Through FederalAid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 34 (2011) ("If graduates' loans came through federal
loan programs, then all debts would be eligible for repayment assistance programs supporting careers in the public interest."). Glater has also critiqued the
variable pricing of loans that would likely be accelerated by further privatization of educational credit programs. Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable
Cost of Variable Pricing of Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137
(2013).
83 Reallocating funds from higher education institutions to the higher interest payments demanded by private lenders would be doubly self-defeating:
it would deter students from enrolling, and reduce funds available for instruction. For more on the negative fiscal impacts of the latter point, see Stacy Berg
Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective
College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117
Q.J. ECON. 1491, 1524 (2002) ("We do find that students who attend colleges
with higher average tuition costs tend to earn higher income years later, after
adjusting for student characteristics .... [T]uition matters because higher cost
schools devote more resources to student instruction."). Reduced incomes mean
reduced future tax-paying potential.
84 Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71,
S71 (1990) ("[T]he stock of human capital determines the rate of growth [and]
too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium."); Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction, 60
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As technology changes the job market, graduate education
is needed more than ever. Yet the risks inherent in training are
also high. For example, while open pharmacist positions were
once plentiful, now pharmacists in most states "are seeing either a
surplus of candidates, or a rough balance of supply and demand."85 It may take a few years for a new equilibrium to be
reached, as older pharmacists retire, or newer ones take on roles
in accountable care organizations, patient-centered medical
homes, integrated community health management teams, or other
innovative forms of health delivery and administration. IBR is
designed to assure that students who take on the risk of investing
in their human capital are not beset by onerous repayment obligations if, through no fault of their own, structural changes in the
economy or cyclical downturns adversely affect their employability. 6 And, for those individuals who do not attain above-average
incomes, it offers a fair deal: the debt burden eventually ends for
those for whom education has not been a winning financial proposition. The alternative, of perpetual obligations, is deeply unfair,
given norms enabling bankruptcy and "fresh starts" for nearly all
other forms of debt.
Against such reasonable present accommodations of risk
in an era of precarity, Delisle and Holt's Zero Marginal Cost presents scare scenarios stretched decades into the future. Even a
professional labor economist would probably blanch at predicting
the likely income patterns of professionals, let alone their repayment strategies, decades hence. By and large, graduates from
non-profit graduate schools entering repayment tend to hear advice like Heather Jarvis recently offered to recent law school
graduates on the American Bar Association website:

ECONOMETRICA 323, 324 (1992); Richard Blundell et al., Human Capital Investment: The Returns from Education and Training to the Individual, the
Firm and the Economy, 20 FISCAL STUD. 1, 16-19 (1999); Alan B. Krueger &
Mikael Lindahl, Educationfor Growth: Why and For Whom?, 39 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1101, 1102, 1108, 1130 (2001).
"I Katie Zadavski, The Pharmacy School Bubble is About to Burst, NEW
REPUBLIC
(Sept.
29,
2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/1 19634/pharmacy-school-crisis-whygood-jobs-are-drying.
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[There are] federal student loan repayment plans that
include low monthly payments based on income. But
understand that the longer it takes you to repay your
loans, the more you will pay over time. If you can establish an aggressive repayment strategy, you can significantly lower the cost of your loans over time. 7

Finally, even if a much higher than expected percentage of graduate students take advantage of IBR, there is plenty of time to
deal with that putative crisis when it arises, rather than preemptively imposing austerity on recent graduates facing a volatile job
market.
Some claim that loan forgiveness just leads to tuition inflation, but it is difficult to verify that claim.8 The "sticker price" of
many schools is indeed high-but close examination of net tuition
paid over the past twenty years tells a more nuanced story. After
adjusting for inflation, David Leonhardt reports, net tuition and
fees at private four-year colleges rose 22% from 1992-2014, and
60% at public four-year colleges.8 9 Gas prices rose 83% in that period, and child care, 44%. 90 In graduate schools, the data is not as
robust, but "price wars" in legal education have been going on for
years. While it is intuitively plausible that increases in federal
support for education cause increases in tuition (a proposition
known as the "Bennett Hypothesis," for former Secretary of Education William Bennett),91 actual evidence is mixed. As Michael

87 Heather Jarvis, Heads Up ILs: How to Finance Your Legal Education
the Smart Way, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 2014, at 18.
88 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Impact of Loan Limit Increases on
College Prices is Difficult to Discern, GAO-14-7, at 2 (2014), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets1670/660991.pdf ("GAO's analysis found that the
economic effects of recession, which affected families' employment income,
and net worth make it difficult to isolate the impact the recession had on students' decisions to borrow money to finance college expenses versus the impact
of the loan limit increases.").
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Simkovic has observed, "there is little evidence in the peerreviewed literature that increases in the availability of public student loans drive up tuition net of scholarships and grants at nonprofit and public institutions of higher education."92 Simkovic observes that "there is some evidence" that the Bennett Hypothesis
holds for for-profit trade schools, but this is a problem better targeted by rules governing those schools, not ones undermining financing opportunities generally (or pushing students out of gov93
ernment lending programs and into more risky private ones).
Delisle and Holt fail to give a credible estimate of the
overall negative fiscal impact of even their own very high estimates of future participation in loan forgiveness programs. And if
they had to estimate all the positive impacts professional schools
have on our economy-such as leading "meds & eds" redevelopment of inner cities, research on cutting edge medicine, and care
and advocacy for the most marginal members of our society, to
name a few-they would find that the government, if anything,
massively underfunds the education sector. Education is a public
good, and plans to increase the cost of its financing are likely to
reduce growth and productivity.
D. Cutting PA YE and PLSF is an Unwise Policy
Delisle & Holt's recommendations for IBR promise little,
if any, savings to the federal government once a full accounting of
the benefits of education is made. Squeezing the often precarious
finances of young graduates will not contribute to economic
growth or fiscal stability. Delisle's work is not limited to student
loans; he has also advocated for "fair value accounting" as a general principle of budgeting. 4 As the CBPP has observed, this approach would artificially inflate the cost of a wide array of federal
credit programs-thereby either reducing their availability, or
raising their costs to beneficiaries. This campaign against feder92 Michael Simkovic, Public Versus Private Student Loans, Brian Leiter's
Law
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(Aug.
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al credit programs would impose a double bind on virtually any
federal loan: if it makes too much money for the government, it is
while if it loses
characterized as something the market should do,
96
subsidy.
Solyndra-style
a
as
shamed
it's
money,
Many students who might be afraid to enroll without IBR
will not actually end up needing IBR. Even if they do, many will
probably still pay enough in interest and taxes that the government comes out ahead. This is why insurance is, overall, a profitable business-individuals are overly risk averse. Providing contingent, targeted social insurance to students via PAYE and
PLSF is a small price to pay for increasing the United States'
economic competitiveness, and it may not be a price at all. The
question is: in aggregate, does IBR increase tax revenue and student loan revenue by more than its cost? This depends on how it
affects behavior of would-be students. Given the high rate of return on education and high marginal tax rates on educated labor,
it doesn't take much of a boost to enrollments and educational attainment for IBR to generate a profit for the federal government.
By raising alarms about the possibility of borrowers, decades hence, filing en masse for debt forgiveness, NAF is building
a case for cutting back on loan forgiveness. If it succeeds, students are likely to rely more heavily on private loans. This could
be a disaster for borrowers, because private lenders often have no
legal obligation to adjust their terms if borrowers become ill or
lose their jobs, whereas government loans include provisions for
income-based repayment and waivers for certain disabilities.
Cuts to IBR would also burden the U.S. economy with a less-
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educated labor force, less able to pay the taxes needed to improve
the country's fiscal outlook. It would be unwise to radically
change PAYE and PSLF on the basis of speculative projections.
III.CONCLUSION: BRINGING THE MACROECONOMIC
IMPACT OF HIGHER EDUCATION BACK IN
Policymakers should be wary of the dominant critiques of
the federal role in lending, especially given troubling alternatives
like increased private loan provision. A common talking point is
that government is spending too much on its credit programs, but
there is no documented unfair subsidy of student loans. There is
some dispute-proponents of traditional accounting show a government profit from the loans, while the "fair value accounting"
(FVA) approach shows a loss." But FVA is based on a category
mistake about the government's cost of lending, and ignores the
documented reduction in costs via government lending.9" Moreover, until the law of government accounting is changed, it makes
little sense to cite the idiosyncratic, biased, and ideologically driven FVA analysis. It serves to corrode the terms of credit available
to students while doing nothing to advance its purported fiscal
aims.
Without competition from federal loans, private lenders
will fill the vacuum, offering shoddier terms to most borrowers
(such as no IBR, higher interest rates, and harsher repayment
terms).99 Some claim that higher rates on loans will lead students
to demand lower tuition, end up with a lower principal balance,
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and keep monthly payments at an equilibrium. But the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York has found that "changing the mortgage rate by 2 percentage points only changes willingness to pay
by about 5 percent on average" for mortgages.10 0 Is elasticity of
demand higher for higher education than for houses? If not, projected cost savings from interest rate increases are likely to be
minimal at best. Critics of IBR have not credibly demonstrated
that federal lending distorts the higher education market more
than it makes up for predictable market failures. Even worse, if
federal lending programs' terms become more harsh, private
lenders may further entrench inequalities by imposing ever more
"risk-based" pricing-for example, by charging higher interest
rates to students at lower ranked schools in order to subsidize
lower rates at higher ranked schools. Such pricing may end up a
self-fulfilling prophecy: students paying a higher interest rate will
have a more difficult time paying off their loans precisely because
of the higher rate.
The comparison between housing and education is instructive in another sense. At present, interest rates on mortgages
are much lower than interest rates on Grad PLUS loans for law
students and other graduate students. There is not much independent good in people investing in owning their homes, as opposed to their investing in mutual funds, bonds, or real estate investment trusts of properties more diversified than a single
family's home.' Those working hard to invest in their human
capital to be engineers, nurses, social workers, lawyers, and other
professionals, are more clearly contributing to society. So, if we
accept a basic assumption that ease of lending terms raises the
value of the thing or service the lending is for, then rates should
be reversed: graduate loans should be less expensive than mortgage loans.
Many educators are concerned about the rising cost of education for low-income and middle class households. However,
simply "reducing costs" is a deeply troubling policy response,
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since the impact on equity and quality are far from clear. The
majority of college instruction is done by exploited adjuncts; it is
hard to imagine how their "cost" could be cut further. 112 Revenues
at educational institutions could be productively reallocated, but
there is little to no objective evidence that higher education itself
takes an unfair share of national GDP. 10 3 Assuming standard levels of economic growth, societies may rationally choose to devote
more resources to human services like education and health care,
and less to, inter alia, military and finance costs. 10 4 These macroeconomic principles should guide future policy directions in the
financing of higher education.
We are now entering a critical phase in the development of
income-based repayment. The program is not helping many of
the students it was designed to aid. At the very least, potential enrollees need straightforward tools to compare the value of various
repayment plans. More substantively, they need faster enrollment
and better terms offered by those plans. Almost no borrowers
should be in default on loans qualified for IBR, but arduous requirements for gaining IBR protections (or incompetence or misinformation from servicers) have left struggling debtors vulnerable. Even worse, some commentators are using the existence of
IBR to justify harsh treatment of student loans in bankruptcyeven though it is now clear that it could hit some borrowers with
a large tax penalty and unknown risks to credit scores. If education finance reform moderates do not substantially improve the
terms and accessibility of IBR, the program will lose popularity
and credibility.
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